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THE FAMILY AUTOMOBILE
THE FAMILY AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY OF THE OWNER
Donald Campbell*
T HE family pictures and the family bible have been in
legal bibliography since the time of Blackstone. The
family automobile has appeared only recently but the
doctrine of liability attendant thereon has caused a great
deal of interest and confusion among laymen, under-
writers, lawyers and courts.
Where the head of a family owns an automobile which
he keeps for the use and pleasure of his family, he be-
comes a potential principal of any member of his fam-
ily who may drive it.
There is no dispute and no difficulty presented when
the agency is established by the ordinary and accepted
use of the phrase "an agent on his principal's business."
If the owner accompanies the driver, or if the owner
orders or requests a member of his family to drive the
car, or if a member of the family is driving the car upon
some business of the owner, and an accident occurs, be-
cause of negligent operation, then the owner becomes
liable.
The courts are not in accord in holding the owner
liable for negligent operation where the owner's per-
mission has been given even for a particular occasion.
And where general permission only has been given,
and where occasional use has been made with knowledge
of the owner, but without particular permission, and
where the owner has kept the car for the use and pleas-
ure of the family and has never objected to its use for
pleasure by members of his family-and the mission has
been for the pleasure or on the individual business of the
*Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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particular member of the family who drove the automo-
bile or who rode in it-then we find the courts splitting
into two definite groups.
One line of decisions holds the owner of the family
automobile not liable for its negligent operation by a
member of the family, when that member of the family
is on his own business or driving for his own pleasure
and a Missouri court said, in a typical case1.
"The fact that he, the son, had his father's special or general
permission to use the car is wholly immaterial."
A second line of decisions holds that a father who has
bought an automobile for the pleasure of the family, has
made it his business to furnish entertainment for mem-
bers of his family, and
"A daughter driving for her own pleasure (or on her own
business), her father's car, kept for the use of the family, is his
servant, for whose negligence in operating the car he is liable"' .
Under the first line of decisions there is no reason to
consider the litigation as involving "The Family Auto-
mobile" for under those decisions the courts have con-
sistently refused to consider an automobile as a family
automobile. They do not distinguish between an auto-
mobile and any other movable property. They do not
consider an automobile as an instrumentality of danger-
ous potentialities and, of course, they do not consider an
automobile to be dangerous per se. They insist that the
accepted theory of principal and agent, or master and
servant, be applied strictly to each case whether an auto-
mobile, a horse or a shotgun be involved. In short, they
do not recognize "The Family Automobile."
At the present writing-the states of Missouri', New
York' Alabama', Utah', Michigan', Virginia' and North
Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1.
'Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486.
'Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111.
'Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361.
'McFarlane v. Winters, 47 Utah 598.
' Loehr v. Abell, 174 Mich. 590.
'Blair v. Broadwater, 121 Va. 301.
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Carolina' have decided according to the strict rule.
However, New Jersey °, New York and North Carolina
have rendered decisions both ways.
The "equitable" doctrine has been upheld by Ken-
tucky', Minnesota", Oklahoma ' , Washington", Georgia",
Massachusetts", Tennessee", Iowa", and New Mexico
and by Illinois".
In the states where the strict doctrine has been ad-
hered to, however, the courts have been quick to seize
upon slight evidence which would fasten liability upon
a "responsible" meaning solvent defendant: i.e., the
owner of the family car.
In the first New Jersey case, where a daughter was
driving the car and was the only member of the family
in it, the court found the owner not liable-but in the
later case, because there were several other members of
the family in the car, which was driven by the son, it was
held that the father was liable. In the latter case the
court seemed to feel that taking several members of the
family out for a ride was the father's business-but in
the former case, the daughter being alone, was on her
own business.
In the first case before the Illinois Supreme Court",
Justice Dunn in delivering the opinion adopted by the
'Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 95.
'Missel v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348.
" Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754.
Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386.
Upphoff v. McCormick, 139 Minn. 132.
McNeil v. McKain, 33 Okla. 449.
'*Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486.
'Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275.
" Jordan v. Smith, 211 Mass. 269.
'King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217.
"Crawford v. McElhinney, 171 Iowa 606.
'2Gates v. Mader, 316 Il. 313.
"Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754.
' Missel v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348.
"Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, at 430.
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majority after commenting upon the equitable reasons
assigned for holding an owner of the family automobile,
liable in cases from other states, disposes of the theories
advanced there by this laconic statement:
"The argument may be sound enough, but it has no applica-
tion to the doctrine of Master and Servant."
In an opinion rendered two years and six months
later, our Supreme Court seized upon the fact that the
minor daughter driving the family automobile was on
her way to pick up a pair of shoes at the cobblers. As
it was her father's business to furnish her with shoes or
other necessaries, the court then said in short that the
daughter was the agent of her father in the performance
of the business she was on. Therefore, the father was
liable".
The decisions have been based upon such matters as
the age of the driver, whether the driver was depend-
ent on the owner for support; whether the permission
to drive was special or general and whether the purpose
of the drive was for a family errand, family pleasure or
for the sole pleasure of the driver.
From a perusal of the various cases, it would seem
that two essentials must exist before the doctrine of the
family automobile can be applied:
FIRST, an automobile maintained by the father for the
use and pleasure of the family.
SECOND, a permission express or implied to the mem-
bers of the family to use the car.
It is not contended by the writer that even though
these essentials exist that the courts adopting the strict
application of the rule of agency will now find the owner
liable, but it is believed that the courts adopting the
equitable rule will then so determine where these two
essentials are shown to exist. Since we are concerned
here primarily with the adoption of the doctrine of the
"Graham v. Page, 300 Ill. 40.
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family automobile, we will dismiss the contrary view
with a quotation from Van Blairicom v. Dodgson, 222
New York Court of Appeals, 111:
"If the owner of a car ought to be responsible for the care-
lessness of everyone whom he permits to use it in the latter's
own business-that liability ought to be sought by legislation
rather than by some new and anomalous slant applied by the
courts to the principals of agency."
That statement in brief is the attitude of the courts of
those states adopting the strict rule.
We may now turn to a discussion of the chronological
holdings of the Supreme Courts of Illinois.
In the case of Arkin v. Page (opinion filed April
15, 1919), a father had provided an automobile
which by the evidence was for the use and pleasure
of his family. It appeared in that case that the car was
used at times by the son, with his father's permission, or
at least, without objection by his father, which is merely
another way of saying that the son had implied permis-
sion from his father to use the car. The son was driv-
ing the automobile alone on his way to a private school
where he expected to register and pay for the tuition
out of money of his own, which he had in the bank. His
father did not know where he was going, nor did he
know that he had the automobile on this particular oc-
casion. The son injured the plaintiff in this case by neg-
ligent driving, and the lower court found the son to be
the agent of the father. The judgment was sustained
by the Appellate Court, but reversed by the Supreme
Court, although with three judges dissenting. The ma-
jority opinion held that at the time and place of the
happening of the accident, there was no agency shown
which could in any way fasten liability upon the father.
The court quoted elaborately from cases holding con-
trariwise under the doctrine of the family automobile,
and after stating that an automobile was not dangerous
per se, insisted that the ordinary rules of agency should
THE FAMILY AUTOMOBILE
be applied to this case. The arguments of counsel with
respect to the practical administration of justice and the
necessity of finding a responsible defendant, rather than
a defendant against whom a judgment would be a mere
form, were said by the court to be, perhaps, sound
enough, but not based upon law.
Illinois thereupon became a state in which this strict
rule had apparently been adopted.
Nevertheless, three justices wrote a dissenting opin-
ion in the same case wherein they insisted that if a par-
ent has provided an automobile for the family use, he
has then made it his business, and any member of the
family driving the car with permission must be consid-
ered to be upon the owner's business. In other words,
the minority decision insisted that pleasure driving by
members of the family or driving on missions of their
own with permission, was as much a part of the own-
er's business as the furnishing of the necessaries of life
in the usually accepted sense. About two years later,
in the case of Graham v. Page", a minor daughter resid-
ing with her father, who had provided the family with
an automobile was driving the car to the cobblers to pick
up a pair of shoes that she had left there to be repaired,
and on the way she injured the plaintiff by her negligent
driving. The Appellate Court reversed the finding of
the trial court where a verdict had been entered in favor
of the plaintiff, basing their decision upon what they un-
derstood to have been the law announced in Arkin v.
Page, by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment of the Appellate Court and Justice
Farmer who had dissented in the Arkin v. Page case, de-
livered the opinion of the court in this latter case. The
Supreme Court seemed to base the finding of agency in
this latter case upon the fact that,
"In this case defendant's daughter was not merely driving the
car for pleasure, but was using it on a family errand, one of the
purposes her father testified he kept the car for and one of the
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purposes he testified his daughter was authorized to drive it for.
The daughter was only sixteen years old, was engaged in no
business, earning no money, but lived with her parents and was
clothed by them. It was the duty and business of her father
to provide her shoes and when needed, to have them repaired. In-
stead of her father taking the shoes to the shop for repair and
getting them there when that had been done, he permitted his
daughter to do it and authorized the use of the car by her for
that purpose. She was performing the business and duty of her
father in the manner and with the means authorized by him. She
was, if not the servant, at least the agent of her father in the
performance of the duty or business."
Had the court stopped right there the writer is of the
opinion that the strict rule as applied in Arkin v. Page,
might be said to have been adhered to in the case of
Graham v. Page, for certainly in the latter case the court
plainly pointed out the distinguishing feature, i.e., that
the daughter was upon her father's business. The hold-
ing in Graham v. Page could then be considered to be
consistent with the holding in Arkin v. Page, although
it would seem that the age of the daughter and the na-
ture of her errand were necessary facts in order to make
her errand her father's business. Fortunately or unfor-
tunately, as the case may be, the court did not stop with
that distinction, but continued with a discussion of the
general principle involved in determining the agency, to
wit:
"The weight of authority supports the liability of the owner of
a car, which is kept for family use and pleasure where an injury
is negligently caused by it while driven by one of his children
by his permission, and the reasoning of those cases seem sound
and more in harmony with the principles of justice. We agree
with the Supreme Court of Tennessee that, where a father pro-
vides his family with an automobile for their pleasure, comfort
and entertainment, 'the dictates of natural justice should require
that the owner should be responsible for its negligent operation,
because only by doing so, as a general rule, can substantial jus-
tice be attained. King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217'."
The above discussion and statement of the court,
whether it may be considered dicta or part of the opin-
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ion, certainly changes the line up of the State of Illinois.
It appears to the writer that the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois thereby committed itself to the equitable doctrine.
Following that decision by the Supreme Court, the
Appellate Court of the First District, in the case of
Cloyes v. Plattje", discussed and reiterated the holding
of the Supreme Court, and again referred to the leading
case of King v. Smythe4, quoting from that case and stat-
ing that the weight of authority now supports the lia-
bility of the owner of a car which is kept for family use
and pleasure, etc. Meanwhile, on February 17, 1925,
in the case of Gates v. Mader5, the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed, if not advanced the doctrine of the fam-
ily automobile given out in the case of Graham v. Page,
but it is interesting to note that three judges in this last
case dissented from the holding of the majority opin-
ion which is written by Justice Farmer, one of the dis-
senters in the first case of Arkin v. Page.
In this last case, a son independent and not living at
home, at the request of his mother, drove the automo-
bile of the father, containing his mother and her friends,
for the pleasure and convenience of the mother. The
son had his father's knowledge and general permission
to drive the car. The Supreme Court found that the
son was the agent of the father and in the opinion, prac-
tically admitted that they had receded from the attitude
held at the time the Arkin v. Page case was decided.
"We said in that case (Graham v. Page) that the weight of
authority supported the liability of the owner of a car kept for
family use and pleasure when an injury was negligently caused by
it while driven by one of his children * * * In our opinion,
liability in this case is based on reason and justice. Defendant
denied he knew that the car was going to be used on a partic-
ular occasion, but admits its use was authorized by him. This
case is not controlled by the Arkin case."
231 11. App. 183.
140 Tenn. 217.
S316 Il1. 313.
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The court then again refers to King v. Smythe, as
well as a number of other cases, in all of which cases
the doctrine of the family automobile has been adopted".
In January 1926 the Appellate Court for the First
District had to again consider a case", wherein a daugh-
ter who was single, living at home and had her father's
general permission to use his automobile, was out driv-
ing with her fiance and her sister. The father had no
knowledge of the particular trip and the defendant con-
tended in this case that it fell outside of the case of
Gates v. Mader for the reason that in Gates v. Mader,
the automobile was being used for the purpose for which
it was bought and that in this case the purpose was for-
eign to that for which the defendant maintained it. In
other words, that the daughter was not driving it for
the pleasure of the family, but on a mission of her own.
The court, however, found itself unable to appreciate
the distinction sought to be made and stated that the
driving of her fiance and sister about the city was well
within the purpose mentioned, i.e., the use and pleasure
of the family.
While it is not possible to foretell what opinion might
be rendered by the Supreme Court of Illinois in a similar
case, where it might be possible to point out a distinc-
tion in facts, yet it would seem that Illinois has definitely
and consciously adopted the doctrine of the family au-
tomobile.
The various courts in arriving at their decisions to
hold the owner of the family automobile liable, have
stated in different ways that liability does not rest upon
a relationship of parent and child nor upon the solvency
of the defendant. It would seem, however, that they
have broadened the scope of the principal's business
and, perhaps, extended the relation of principal and
agent more than they might have done had the automo-
bile not come into such common use. The word permis-
"See classified cases cupra.
"Beesley v. Goldstein, 239 Ill. App. 231.
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sion has been freighted with liability. From the follow-
ing excerpts taken from various cases, the reader might
come to the conclusion that the doctrine of the family
automobile has been adopted in the interests of justice
and equity, rather than strict application of law.
King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217.
"If an instrumentality (automobile) of this kind is placed in
the hands of his family by a father for the family's pleasure, com-
fort and entertainment, the dictates of natural justice should re-
quire that the owner should be responsible for its negligent op-
eration, because, only by doing so, as a general rule can substan-
tial justice be attained."
"We think the practical administration of justice between the
parties is more the duty of the court than the preservation of
some esoteric theory concerning the law of principal and agent."
Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486.
"Any other view would set a premium upon the failure of the
owner to employ a competent chauffeur."
"The adoption of a doctrine so callously technical would be
little short of calamitous."
Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420 (dissenting opinion).
"The owner must anticipate that negligence in operating may
produce the most serious consequences."
Gates v. Mader, 316 Ill. 313.
"In our opinion liability in this case is based on reason and
justice."
Missell v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348 (usually contra)
where court seized upon the fact that son was driving
mother and sister:
"It is within the scope of the father's business to furnish his
wife and daughter with outdoor recreation, just the same as it is
his business to furnish them with food and clothing * * *."
The courts that refuse to adopt these equitable and
modifying rules to the strict rules of agency say that here
is a fine example of legislation by the courts.
The adherents of the family automobile doctrine re-
spond to the effect that courts may apply the old rules
of agency to new conditions and still function properly
and justly. Popular sentiment or legislation will prob-
ably bear them out.
